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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
WERNER KIEPE, ) 
Pliantiff-Appellant and 
Cross-Repondent, 
-vs.-
ELI D. LeCHEMINANT, 
Defendant-Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIE,F 
No.10310 
Appeal from Judgment of the Third District Court 
for Salt Lake County 
Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, Judge 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CAS.E 
This is an action on an accounting upon. the d.issolUt-
tion of a partne·rship. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE MADE IN LOWER COURT 
1. The lower court entered a judgment dated June 
27, 1966, which provided, among other things: 
(a) That the Defendant is awarded the sum of 
$2,500.00 for service for a period of thirteen months sub-
sequent to the date of dissolution of the partnership in 
"preserving the mortgage loan asset" of the partnership. 
(b) The accocunting submitted through Lawrence 
8. Pinnoek, C.P.A., setting forth the account of the par-
2 
ties from January 1, 1963, to the close of business, 1964, 
is ordered adopted as modified, under which it is deter-
mined that the Defendant is entitled to the sum of $16,-
433.22 out of the cash on hnd of $28,723.98, together with · 
interest thereon. 
(c) The compensation paid to Ruth Barlow and R. 
L. Christensen are allowed as a partnership expense. 
( d) The fee charged by Lawrence S. Pinnock, C.P.A. I 
is a partnership expense. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the following portions of, 
the judgment entered June 27, 1966, ~md judgment in 
his favor as a matter of law thereon : 
(1) The award of $2,500.00 to Respondent for, 
"preserving the mortgage loan asset of the partnership."· 
(2) Adjudging that the Defendant is entitled to 
the sum of $16,433.22 out of the cash on hand of $28,723.98,' 
together with interest thereon. 
Appellant also seeks reversal of the order of the 
Court denying his motion to amend the judgment dated 
March 12, 1964, to provide that the Respondent pay intou: 
special fund a sum of $981.96 in addition to the sum of 7~ 1 
per cent of $9,819.65 ordered paid by the Court into said 
fund out of which overcharges made by Respondent from 
patrons of the partnership should be repaid. (R. 134) 
Respondent seeks reven;al of the following portioni 
of the judgment dated June 27, 1966 : 
I 
I 
I 
0 
tJ 
(1) The compensation paid to Ruth Barlo•w 
and R. L. Christensen is allowed as a partnership expense. 
(2) The Defendant is awarded the sum of $2,500.00 
for his efforts for a period of 13 months subsequent to the 
r dissolution of the partnership in preserving the mortgage 
loan asset of the partnership, when Defendant had asked 
for $5,000.00. 
(3) The fee charged by Lawrence S. Pinnock, C.P.A., 
is a partnership expense. 
(4) Awarding to Respondent a net balance credit 
of $16,433.22 out of the cash on hand of $28,723.90 when 
Respondent is Pntitled to an amount in excess of said 
sum. (R. 146) 
STArrE1MENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and Respondent commenced business as 
of October 1, 1943, as real estate brokers (R. 3), under an 
' agreement that 50 per cent of all fees and commissions 
earned for real estate listings, rentals, and sales, apprais-
als and insurance commissions should be paid to the part-
ner producing the same (R. 3) and the remaining 50 per 
cent should be put into the profit and loss acccount from 
which all expenses of operating the bminess should be 
paid, and the balance divided equally between the part-
ners. 
Later it was agreed that the division of fees end com-
ntissions should be changed to pay to the one producing 
the same 50 per cent of all such fees and commissions 
from $1.00 to $7,200.00; 521/z per cent of total commis-
4 
sions from $7 ,200.00 to $8,400.00; 55 per rent of total coin. 
missions from $8,4-00.00 to $9,600.00; 571/z per cent of total 
conunissions from $9,600.00 to $12,000.00; ruid 60 per cent 
of total conunissions in excess of $12,000.00 (R 242 and · 
294). All sums so paid in excess of 50 per cent of commis-
sions earned have been considered as bonuses and paid 
at the end of each calendar year. 
Subsequent to October 1, 1943, State Mutual Insur- i 
ance Company of Worcester, Massachusetts, appointed : 
the partnership an agent to make real estate loans for it 
and collections of payments thereon, and agreed to pay 
one-half of one per cent of the total outstanding loans be 
longing to State Mutual Insurance Company each year 1 
for such collection service. For the making of such loam, 
loan fees were charged by the partnership and collected 
from the borrowers. The making of the loans and super-
vising of the collections was largely the work of the Re-
spondent (R. 195and196). The fees for making the loam 
and commissions on fire insurance sold with the loans' 
were credited to the partner making them, usually the 
Respondent. 
The Respondent at all times supervised the keeping 
of the books of the partnership. Until after the Appellant 
gave notice of the termination of the partnership on De· 
cember 30, 1962, he was unfamiliar with the books. After 
the Respondent gave notice of termination of the partner· 
ship, Appellant checked the books and upon his findingi 
filed suit against the Respondent alleging that the R1 
spondent had used for his own individual use and bPI11 f, 
5 
sums of money exceeding his share of the partnership 
income, and that he refused to account therefor to the 
Appellant (R. 1). 
Trial was held on November 26, December 9, 10, 11, 
12, 13, 19 and 20, 1963. Court ordered the Respondent 
to pay to. the Appellant on account thereof $+,6!!7.70 by 
the judgment of March 12, 1964 ( R. 61, 62). By said 
judgment the Respondent was ordered to place into a 
special account 75 per cent of $9,819.65 and Appellant 
was ordered to pay into said account 25 per cent of said 
$9,818.65, from which overcharges to customers of the 
partnership made by the Respondent should be repaid 
and the balance l·~maining after said shipments should be 
divided 50 per cent to t:he Respondent and 50 per cent 
to the Appellant (R. 61, 62). From Exhibit P. 10 (R. 61-
62), it appears that the Respondent had received 75 
per cent of $9,819.65 plus a bonus of $981.96 thereon, and 
Appellant had received 25 per cent of $9,819.65 (R. 316). 
The appelllant served notice of the dissolution of the 
partnership upon Respondent on December 30, 1962. Re-
spondent agreed to the dissolution. 
From January 1, 1963, to February 1, 1964, the part-
ners continued to operate the business in the same man-
ner as they had done prior to notice of dissolution. On 
1<'eb111ary 1, 196-±, Respondent removed from the office 
space occupied by the partnership, and the Appellant took 
full control of the books, records, and other assets of the 
partnership. 
On Ji\,hrnary 13, 1964, a hearing was had upon Re-
6 
spondent's claim for "compensation for his preserving 
the mortgage loan account with State Mutual Insurance 
Company" during the period o.f January 1, 1963, to Feb- , 
ruary 1, 1964, and upon his motion that wages paid to I 
R. L. Christensen and Ruth Barlow be paid by the Appel-
lant instead of by the partnership for the same period 
(R. 174-157). 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the purport of the 
evidence was discussed by the Court with Counsel, during 
which counsel for the Respondent made the following 
statement: 
''I said if they would be willing to invoke the part· 
nership agreement all the way down the line, 
we would be willing to do that. But they want to 
omit the renewal insurance and that means that 
much more disadvntage to us." 
(R.244) 
The Oourt then stated: 
"All right. The Court will adopt the suuggestion 
of Mr. Backman that we go all the way down the .. 
line * * *. Neither pa.rtner will receive a1iy speci~l · 
compensation for services during this interim pert· 
od, and all of the expenses by whichever depart· . 
ment incurred or by whom will be lumped together: 
and deducted from the JJrofit and loss account. ' 
if there is sUJf ficient in there and the balance shall I 
be distributed equally bet~een the partners. I 
won't need to take it under advisement, and you 
can proceed accordingly and wind up today if yo11 
want." (R. 245) 
A judgment was signed on March 12, 1964, pursuant 
to the Court's decision aforesaid (R. 60-64) which pm-
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nong other things, as follows : 
11. 1The judgment herein entered constitutes an 
ccord arnd satisfaction of all claims each of the 
•arties hereto has against the other. The court re-
ains jurisdiction of this action to hear arnd deter -
iine any urnresolved disputes which may now ex-
>t." (R. 64) 
;he transcript of evidence taken at said hearing 
:o 245), more than half thereof was devoted to 
concerning the preservation of the mortgage 
,et by the Respondent. As abo·ve stated, at the 
}n of the testimony, the Court stated that neither 
rnld receive any special compensation for services 
he interim period (R. 245 ). The provisions of the 
tt quoted, that the judgment constitutes accord 
[sfaction o.f all claims each of the parties had 
the other, ref erred particularly to the Respond-
1im for special compenesation for "preserving 
1:gage loan asset." This decision resolved the 
between the parties over the claim of Respondent 
i compensation for "preserving the mortgage loan 
rrhe judgment constituted an accord and satisfac-
ill claims of each party against the other includ-
matter of payments to R .L. Christensen and 
1rlow (R. 64). This judgment became final on 
'1964. 
June 13 and June 24, 1964, hearings were had 
titions filed by each of the parties against the 
1r an order to show cause why the other should 
1unish<>cl for c·ontempt of court for failure to com-
8 
ply with the judgment of March 12, 1964. 
When the hearing commenced on June 13, 1964, a 
counsel for the Respondent stated: ! E 
"Th" . d" d h I is is a procee mg - an or er to s ow cause I 
issued by the Court for Mr. Kiepe to show cause! 
why he should not be found in contempt of court.''\ 
(R. 246) 
No pleadings were submitted. Not a word of evi-1 
dence was adduced, and not a word was mentioned on the 
matter of payment of any compensation to the Respond-
ent for his efforts in ''preserving the mortgage loan asset" 
of the partnership. (R. 246 to 307) At the conclusion of/ 
that hearing, the Court stated that he would accept briefs~ 
only on the following matters : 
1. Contempt. 
2. Bonuses to be paid over and above the, 50 per cent 
producers basic compensation. 
3. Salary paid to Mrs. Barlow. 
4. 8alary paid to Mr. Christensen. 
The Court stated: 
"These four items are the only items concerning 
the Court" (R. 307). 
I 
On November 9, 1964, judgment was entered on! 
the hearing of June 13, 1964, continued to June 24, 1961,' 
which provided, among other things: 
1. That the Respondent shall be paid $2,500.00 for 
1 
his efforts in preserving the mortgage loan asset of the 1 
partnership. 
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2. Compensation heretofore paid to Ruth Barlow 
and R. L. Christensen shall be allowed as partnership 
expense to be borne equally by the partners. 
3. The fee charged by Lawrence S. Pinnock, C.P.A., 
shall be bo,rne equally by the partners. 
4. That each partner shall be paid $535.00 as a 
bonus. 
5. That refunds of $3,668.71 should be paid to the 
Appellant, and the Respondent is entitled to receive 
$16,433. 22 out of cash on hand in the partnership of 
$28,723.98 (R. 109-1'10) 
Appellant filled a motion to amend the judgment of 
the 1Court dated March 12, 1964, to provide that the Re-
spondent pay into the special fund for refunds of over-
charges an additional sum of $981.96 (R. 13.)4 The 
Court denied the motion (R. 144). 
Appellant filed his appeal upon the following points, 
among others : 
Point One. The award of $2,500.00 to the Re-
spondent by the judgment of November 9, 1964, is 
not supported by pleadings or Findings of Fact. 
Point Three. The issue upon which that por-
tion of the judgment of November 9, 1964, award-
ing Defendant LeCheminant $2,500.00 for his ef-
forts in "preserving the mortgage loan asset of 
the partnership" was tried and decided contrary 
to the said portion of said judgment of November 
9, 1964, by the judgment of the trial court entered 
on Mmch 12, 1964, which judgment had become 
10 
final and was res judicata of said issue at tJi, 
time of the entry of said judgment designater; 
Order of November 9, 1964. 
Point Four. There are no pleadings or .F'ind. 
ings of Fact or Conclusions of Law nor any evi. 
dence or other proof to support that portion ot 
the judgment awarding each party $535.00 as a 
bonus, ... which brings the credits to which De 
fendant is entitled to $20,101.93. 
I 
Point Five. There are no pleadings or Find 
ings of Fact or Conclusions of Law nor any en 
dence or other proof to support the follo\\~m 
portion of he judgment designated Order of Ne;! 
vember 9, 1964, which reads: ''This brings total I 
credits to which Defendant is entitled to the sw11 1 
of $20,101.93, less refunds of $3,668.71 heretofortl 
ordered by the Judge to be made by the Defend-! 
ant results in a net balance credit to whicl1f 
Defendant is entitled of $16,433.22 out of the cas1i 
on h::ind of $28,723.98 shown by the account fik1li 
he rem. i 
Point Six. The Court erred in denying Plain· I 
tiff's motion to amend judgment of Mar. 12, 19G+.' 
After hearing the appeal, this Court on the 5th day 
of May, 1966, entered the following decision: 
''This cause having been heretofore argued ana 
submitted and the Court being sufficiently ad· 
vised in the premises, it is now ordered, adjudgra 
and decreed that the judgment of the District 
Court be and the same is vacated and set aside. 
The cause is remanded to the trial court for th1 
making of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 16\" 
and Judgment based thereon, and/or for su_cl1 
further proceedings as the trial court may in it'· 
dicretion deem advisable in the premises, eal'I 
party to bear his own costs." (R. 150) 
11 
When the files in this case were received in the Dis-
trict Court, the Court permitted counsel for the Respond-
ent to draw Findings of F·act, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment, which the Court signed on June 27, 1966 (R. 
153-158). Plaintiff then filed a motion for amendments 
of Findings of Fact, ·Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
(R. 159-162), which the Court denied. (R. 164) 
The Plaintiff then timely filed his notice of appeal. 
(R. 165--166) 
Appellant appeals from the following portions of said 
judgment: 
"4. Defendant is awarded the sum of $2,500.00 
for his efforts for service for a period of 13 
months subsequent to the date of dissolution of 
the partnership in "preserving the mortgage loan 
asset of the patnership." 
"6. The accounting submitted through Lawrence 
S. Pinnock, C.P.A., * * * is ordered adopted as 
modified under which it is determined that De-
fendant is entitled to the sum of $16,433.24 out 
o.f the cash on hand of $28,723.98, together with 
interest thereon.'' 
Appellant appeals from the following Findings of 
Fact which included, among other things, the following: 
"The compensation awarded by this court to the 
defendant in the sum of $2,500.00 for the preser-
vation of assets should be added to the sum of 
$17,066.93 shown as credit due defendant from 
the credit shown as due Plaintiff in said account 
of $10,847.05 in order to carry out the judgment 
of this court as the same applied to the graduated 
bonus plan of the partnership in determining 
12 
commissions to be allocated to each party hereto 
and which amounts to the sum of $1,070.00 of 
which each party is entitled to one-half thereol 
or $535.00. This brings total credits to $20,101.9J. 
to which Defendant is entitled, less refunds ol / 
$3,668. 71 hereto.fore ordered by the court to be : 
made by the Def endnt, and results in a net balance: 
credit to which Defendant is entitled of $16,433.ZI 
out of the cash on hand of $28, 723.98 shown by 
the account filed herein." 
Respondent cross-appeals from said judgment upon I 
the following grounds: 
1. The Court erred in adjudging that the com· 
pensation paid to Ruth Barlow and R. L. Chris-
tensen should be allowed as a partnership expense. 
2. The award of $2,500.00 to Respondent should 
be $5,000.00. 
3. The Court erred in charging the fee of Law-
rence S. Pinnock, C.P.A. to the partnership. 
4. The Court erred in finding tht the Respondent , 
is entitled to receive only the sum of $16,433.23 
out of the cash on hand of $28, 723.98. 
Following is the evidence pertinent to the matter> 
1l 
at issue in this appeal and cross-appeal: I 
Before the Court commenced taking testimony at 
1 
the hearing of February 13, 1964, he stated that it was \ 
his understanding that the only thing to be considered 
at the hearing ''is the respective service rendered to this / 
operation since the dissolution," to which counsel for 
the Respondent answered, "Yes." (R. 164) 
Mr. LeCheminant was the first witness called. He 
testified in effect that the mortgage loan business con· 
13 
sisted of making collections from some 600 accounts on 
a monthly basis. The work of seeing that the accounts 
were kept current is more than a clerical operation. 
That was the work he performed. During the year they 
had had 81 of the 600 aooounts which required more or 
Jess collection effort every month. State Mutual InsUir-
ance ·Company required a delinquency statement and a 
statement of the reasons for delinquencies each month 
(R. 165). 
When Mr. Kiepe terminated the partnership, State 
Mutual Life could have cancelled its ~ontract with the 
partnership at any time and it was necessary to put 
forth additional effort to make sure that the accounts 
were properly handled (R. 166). 
It was necessary to call personally upon some of 
the delinquent mortgagors. Respondent went to Draper 
on two or three occsions and to Magna on one. He went 
to Bountiful and Centernlle. During the year he made 
20 to 25 personal visitations and had personal conver-
sations with mortgagors. Some calls were made after 
office hours, some dUJring the day. During the year he 
further checked 70 to 100 homes. When Mr. Saunders 
of State Mutual Insurnace Company was in Salt Lake 
City, he inspected with him probably 20 houses (R. 167). 
During the year he submitted about 8 or 9 residential 
loans and in addition about 11 commercial loans on which 
he had done considerable work They were all turned 
down (R. 168). 
He said he spent at least a part of each working day 
14 
at the office on the business of maintaining the loans I,· 
(R. 170). 
At the beginning of 1963, the to.tal amount of rnort-
gage loan business which they were servicing was close 
to $7,000,000.00 (R. 174). During 1963 the submission 
of loans was minor, and the insurance renewals until I 
September, 1963, were negligible. From May to Sep- ! 
tember, 1963, they had about 60 policies of insurance that , 
had to be registered and sent out to customers and after 
that tinie there were some 400 that were all renewed at 
practically the same time (R. 171). I 
The Respondent testified that Ruth Barlow did 
nothing except a small amount of work from May to 
September on insurance accounts. He testified that he 
informed Mr. Kiepe that he would refuse to pay any 
part of Ruth Barlow's salary, that she was not needed , 
in the office, that she came there to do Mr. Kiepe 's per- I 
sonal work (R. 174). 
Respondent further testified that the partnership 
income approximated $33,000.00 on the mortgage loan 
aooount and the insurance account, with an expense of 
$10,700.00; so that Respondent's share of the income 
from the mortgage loan department would net $11,150.00 
and Appellant's share would be the same. 
In addition, during 1963 Respondent's income from 
appraisal work was approximately $1,000.00 and approx· 
imately $110.00 from real estate sales and listings. Hif 
commissions on one commercial loan was $5,600.00, and 
on two residential loans about $350.00, and on per~onal 
15 
insurance commissions $800.00 or $900.00 (R. 182). 
On cross-examination, Respondent testified that his 
activities in 1963 were no different from any other year 
so far as his mortgage loan business was concerned. 
He worked just as hard in 1960, 1961 and 1962 as he did 
in 1963 on that phase of the business. There was nothing 
new after the dissolution of the partnership in the amount 
of effort that he put into the mortgage loan business 
(R.195-196). 
He was then asked the following question and gave 
t hefollowinganswer: 
"Then the only thing that remams to be done is 
to take care of the delinquent payments after that 
and make reports to the insurance company, isn't 
that correct?" 
Answer: ''1That is substantially correct." (R. 196) 
The Respondent wrote 5 to 7 letters a month to 
State Farm Mutual Insurance Gompny on collections. 
It would take maybe 15 minutes to write a letter (R. 198). 
Appellant introduced into evidence and read into 
the record a letter dated December 9, 1963, from State 
Mutual Insurance Company to the Respondent which is 
most uncomplimentary of Respondent's handling of the 
mortgage loan account (R. 203-204) 
Ruth Barlow was called and testified insubstance 
as follows : During 1963 from February 17 to August 31, 
the period of time during which she was employed by 
the vartnership, the Respondent arrived at the office on 
th11 average about 9 :30 in the morning. His leaving time 
16 
was at 3 :00 or 3 :30 each day. On at least two or three. 
days a week he would leave about 11 :00 and come bad1 
at 1 :00. He UJSually spent the time between 11 :00 ana 
1 :00 at the Deseret Gym. vVhen he left the office in the 
afternoon he usually went home or to the Deseret Gym. 
He had a standing appointment two days a week ati 
3 :00 with Brother Jonathan at the Deseret Gym. (R. 210.: 
211). 
Respondent spent part of a morning twice a month 
dictatiing on delinquent accounts (R. 212). 'When she 
worked with Respondent, he dictated reports to State 
Mutual Insurance Company and she typed them, usually 
two-page letters. It didn't take long. She was his secre. 
tary in 1960, 1961 and 1962. His comingand going during 
those years was the same as 1963 ( R. 212-213). 
Respondent's personal mortgage loans which he ha<l 
in the office in 1963 amounted to $108,565.24 as of Apnl 
16, 1963 (R. 216). 
Mr. Kiepe testified in substance that he employee 
Mr. R. L. Christensen as an understudy to help him iJi 
making appraisals. Mr. Christensen did a great deal oi 
work in bringing up to date the accounting system in 
the loan account and in bringing to date the insurance 
policies. Mr. Kiepe stated that he employed people 111 
carry on the mortgage loan business because he fou111J 
there was a very bad accumulation of insurance policie' 
which needed to be sent out. He employed Ruth Barlo11 
for that purpose. Later on others helped in the salli' 
process (R. 220-221). 
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Appellant finished $28,825.00 of appraisal work in 
1963 and produced $3,295 in real estate commissions (R. 
242). Thus Appellant produced $32,120.00 income dur-
ing 1963, one-half of which was turned into the partner-
ship. 
The bonuses each earned during 1959 to and includ-
ing 1962 (R. 294) and during the period in question, 1963 
(A. 120-122) were as follows: 
Year LeChemina;nt 
1959 --------------------------------------$ 4,046.34 
1960 -------------------------------------- 1,676.39 
1961 -------------------------------------- 1,862.62 
1962 ------------------------------------- 1,848.58 
1963 -------------------------------------- 908.19 
Kiepe 
$ 2,368.14 
2,001.00 
2,139.20 
1,731.37 
2,364.96 
The earnings of the parties during the period of 
January 1, 1963, to February 1, 1964, were (R. 120-122): 
LeChemin.ant 
Co1mnissions -------------··-··--··$ 9,190.95 
Bonus ····--·---··--··-·-·---··--······- 980.19 
Share of Profits ------------·--- 15,556.44 
Total ·········-··--···--·--·---·-$25,655.58 
Kiepe 
$16,479.79 
2,365.96 
15,556.44 
$34,403.19 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE JUDGMENT THAT DEFENDANT IS AW ARD-
ED THE SUM OF $2,500.00 FOR SERVICES FOR A 
PERIOD OF 13 MONTHS SUBSEQUENT TO DATE 
OF DISSOLUTION OF THE PARTNERSHIP IN PRE-
SERVING THE MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET OF THE 
PARTNERSHIP IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE. 
The judgment of June 27, 1966, provided, among 
other provisions, as follows : 
"4. Defendant is awarded the sum of $2,500.00 
for his efforts for service for a period of 13 
months subsequent to the date of dissolution of 
the partnership in preserving the mortgage loan 
asset of the partnership." 
If, for sake ofargument (but which Appellant de-
nies), it is assumed that the jUJdgment of March 12, 196±, 
had not become res judicata before the Court reversed 
any part of the judgment of March 12, 1964, denying 
Respondent any compensation for services rendered in 
"preserving the mortgage loan account," no such a.ward 
should have been made to the Respondent for the reason 
that the evidence adduced at the hearing of February 13, 
1964, would not support such an award. During the 
course of the trial of this issue on February 13, 1964, 
counsel for the Respondent asked Respondent what, in 
his opinion, would be fair compensation to be awarded 
to him by the Court for his services in preserving the 
mortgage loan asset. The Court interjected: 
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"You mean for extra services rendered during 
the interim period¥'' 
to which Mr. Backmn replied, "Yes." (R. 174-175) 
The Respondent by his evidence attempted to prove 
that he had rendered great service to the partnership in 
preserving the mortgage loan asset,, but in fact by his 
own testimony he established that he had performed no 
extrn services in that particular during the period Jan-
nary 1, 1963, to February 1, 1964 (R. 195-196), and at 
the conclusion of the testimony the Court stated: 
"Neither party will receive any special compensa-
tion for services during this interim period." (R. 
245) 
Pursuant to said ruling, a judgment was entered on 
Mareh 12, 1964, ( R. 60-64) which provided, among other 
things: 
''11. The judgment herein entered constitutes an 
accord and satisfaction of all claims each of the 
parties hereto has against the other." 
which referred particularly to Respondent's claim for 
special compensation for "preserving the mortgage loan 
asset." 
Respondent testified that his activities in 1963 (the 
interim period were no different from any other year 
so far as the mortgage loan business was concened. He 
worked just as hard in 1960, 1961, and 1962 on that phase 
of the business as he did in 1963. There was nothing 
new after the dissolution of the partnership in the amount 
of pffort that he put into the mortgage loan business 
IR, 195). 
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Respondent was paid $40,000.00 by Appellant for 
his interest in the partnership assets (R. 61), whrch was 
almost entirely for the mortgage loan asset. He receivea 
more for his half interest in that asset from the Appel. 
lant than he was willing to pay to Appellant for his hali 
interest therein (R. 61). The Court ordered the income 
from January 1, 1963, to February 1, 1964, to be distri~ 1 
uted in the same manner as provided in the partnership 
agreement (R. 63). This is in accordance with the pro. 
visions of Section 48-1-27, Utah Code Annotated, 195J
1 
relative to winding up of a partnership after dissolution. 
Respondent took care of the mortgage loan asset for 
many years before 1963, but received no special compen· 
sation therefor in addition to hi::; fees for making loans 
and commissions on insurance written with the loans. 
The amount Respondent received for his work in 
1963 was grossly excessive considering the time and 
effort he put into the business and the very limited 
amount of new commissions he brought into the partner· 
ship. He received $25,655.58 (R. 120, 122) for approxi· 
mately half-days' work (R. 210-211). He brought in 
$8,550.00 of new income (R. 182) while Mr. Kiepe brought 
in $32,120.00 of new income, consisting of the apprais~ 
fees and real estate sales conunissions (R. 242) and re-
ceived $34,402.19 (R. 120, 122). 
It was chiefly the income from the asset which tht 
Appellant paid $40,000.00 for Respondent's half interes! 
which resulted in the payment to Respondent of $25. 
655.58, hi::; 1963 income ( R. 121). 
21 
Respondent's manner of "preserving the mortgage 
loan asset" brought a severe reprimand from State Mu-
tual Insurance Company. See letter of December 19, 
19G3, to Respondent (R 203-204). 'rhis letter raises the 
t[nestion: Did Hespondent preserve the mortgage loan 
asset or did he put it in jeopardy~ 
The payment of any extra compensation to Re-
spondent finds no support in the evidence. 
POINT TWO 
THE ISSUE UPON WHICH THE A WARD OF $2,500 
TO THE RESPONDENT BY THE JUDGMENT OF 
JUNE 27, 1966 WAS TRIED ON FEBRUARY 13, 1964, 
AND WAS ADJUDGED AGAINST THE RESPOND-
ENT BY THE JUDGMENT OF MARCH 12, 1964, 
WHICH JUDGMENT HAD BECOME FINAL AND 
WAS RES JUDICATA OF SAID ISSUE AT THE 
TIME OF THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENTS OF NO-
VEMBER 9, 1964, AND OF JUNE 27, 1966. NO MO-
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OR MOTION TO BE 
RELIEVED OF SAID JUDGMENT OF MARCH 12, 
1964, HAS EVER BEEN FILED, NOW NEARLY 
THREE YEARS SINCE IT WAS ENTERED. 
The issue upon which the award of $2,500.00 to Re-
spondent was made by the judgment of November 9, 
1964, was tried on February 13, 1964. At the conclusion 
of the evidence the Court ruled: 
''Neither party will receive any compensation for 
services during this interim period." (R 244-245). 
'I'lw judgment was signed and filed by the Court 
pu1~nant tu. said ruling (R. 60-64) which provided among 
1t'1P1· things: 
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"9. All income of each party hereto from Janu 
ary 1, 1963, to February 1, 1964, is hereby ordered 
to be received and distributed in the same man. 
ner as is provided by the partnership agreemen1, 
and as has heretofore been received and dis trio 
uted. • • • 
"11. ·The judgment herein constituites an accordi 
and satisfaction of all claims each of the partiei I 
hereto has against the other." · 
Of the transcript of evidence taken at said hearing 
(R. 153 to R. 245), mor ethan half thereof was devoted:. 
to evidence concerning the preservation of the mortgage· 
loan asset by the Respondent. As above stated, at the 
conclusion of the testimony the Court said that neither 
party would receive any special compensation for serv-
ices during the interim period (R. 245). The provisions 
of the judgment quoted, that the judgment constituted 
an accord and satisfaction of all claims each of the 
parties had against the other, referred particularly to 
the Respondent's clain1 for special compensation fo1 
"preserving the mortgage loan asset" (R. 64). 
The judgment became final on April 11, 1964. On 
June 13, and on June 24, 1964, a hearing was had upon 
petitions filed by each of the parties against the other 
for an order to show cause why the other should not bl' 
punished for contempt of court for failure to comply 
with the judgment of March 12, 1964. 
When the hearing commenced on June 13, 1964, 
counsel for the Respondent stated: 
I 
11, 
D· 
"This is a proceeding - an order to show cause 
issued by the Court for Mr. Kiepe to show cause 
why he should not be found in contempt of court." 
(R. 246) 
No pleadings were submitted. Not a word of evi-
dence was adduced, and not a word was mentioned on 
the matter of payment of any compensation to the Re-
spondent for his efforts in preserving the mortgage loan 
asset of the partnership (R. 246 to 307). At the conclu-
sion of that hearing, the Court stated that he would 
d: accept briefs only in the following matters: 
e· 1. Contempt. 
2. Bonuses to be paid over and above the 50 per 
cent producers basic compensation. 
3. Salary paid to Mrs. Barlow. 
4. Salary paid to Mr. Christensen. 
The Court stated: 
"These four items are the only items concerning 
the Court." (R. 307) 
On September 14, 1964, the Court gave a written 
memorandum decision on the hearings of June 13 and 
June 24, 19G-±, which included the following: 
1. 'rhat the Respondent should receive the sum of 
$2,500.00 for his efforts during the period January 1, 
1963, to February 1, 1964, in preserving the mortgage 
loan asset of the partnership. 
Aince February 13, 1964, no evidence has ever been 
1 ntrodnePd on the matter of awarding Respondent com-
[Jl'll:-;ation for "preserving the mortgage loan asset." No 
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motion to amend the judgment or for any relief there 
from has ever been filed. The judgment co'Ul1.d not b~ 
set aside or amended without filing a motion to amena 
within a reasonable time, which in this case would not 
be more than ninety days (Rule 60(b), Utah Rules oi 
Civil Procedure. 
The law of res judicata has been well establisheu 
in prior decisions of this court. In Knight vs. Flattop 
Mining C.ompa;ny, 6 Utah 2d 51, 305 P. 2d 503, this court, 
quoting from 30 Am. J ur. 920, Section 178 of J udgmenli, 
stated: 
"It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudent· 
that material facts or questions which were iii 
issue in a former action and were there adrnitteo 
or judicially determined, are conclusively settleo 
by the judgment rendered therein, a:nd that sucn 
facts or questions become res judicata and lllll) 
not again be litigated in a subsequent action witn 
the same parties or their privies, regardless o! 
the form the issue may take in the subsequent at· 
tion. • • .,, 
In 30 A Am. Jur., Page 388, Section 346, the follow· 
ing is stated: 
"In stating the doctrine of res judicata, ref e.ren~1 
is frequently made by the coruirts to 'an existi~I 
judgment'. The doctrine of res judicata prevail: 
as long as the judgment used as a basis thereoi 
remains in full and operative effect and has nor 
been reversed or otherwise set aside." 
In 30 A Am. Jur., Page 400, Section 359, the follo11 
ing is stated: 
25 
''Generally speaking, the rule of res judicata ap-
plies to all jumcial determinations, whether made 
in actions legal or equitable and in special or 
summary proceedings. * * *" 
In Section 360 of 30 A. Am. J ur., Page 400, the fol-
lowing is stated: 
"* * * But the effect of an adjudication of res 
judicata is not confined in its application to sub-
sequent independent proceedings, but applies to 
a collateral proceeding in the same action. When 
an issue has been finally determined, the principle 
of res judicata prevents a re-litigation of that 
issue, whether in the same or in an independent 
suit." 
Apparently the trial court took the position that he 
could change any judgment entered by him at any time. 
In the case of Frost vs. District Court of Box Elder 
Coimty, 96 Utah 196, 83 P. 2d 737, the Court quoted with 
approval from Freeman on .Judgments, Volume 1 of the 
Fifth Edition, Section 141, as follows: 
''As a general rule, unless control over it has been 
retained in some proper manner, or a statute 
otherwise provides, no final judgment can be 
amended after the term in which it was rendered 
or after it otherwise. becomes a final judgment. 
rl'he power of courts to correct clerical errors and 
misprisons and to make the record speak the 
truth by nunc pro tune amendments after the 
term does not enable them to change their judg-
ments in substance and in any material respect." 
'I'he only control over the judgment which the court 
r ... tain(•<l wa:-; as follows: 
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"The court retains jurisdiction of this action tr. 
hear and determine any unresolved dispwtes whicn 
may now exist or which may hereafter arise be 
tween the parties relative to the subjert matter 
in this action.'' (R. 64) 
The above is a portion of the judgment of Marci 
12, 1964. 
The matter of special compensation to the Respond. 
ent was the chief subject of the hearing of Februan 
13, 1964, and resolved the disputes as to that matter. 
The judgment further stated: 
''11. The judgment herein entered constitutes an 
accord and satisfaction of all claims each of tht 
parties hereto has against the other." (R. 64) 
As this court stated in K ettiner vs. Snow, 13 Utan 
2d 384, 375 P. 2d 28: 
''We are in accord with the proposition urged b) 
the defendant that the trial court has broad dis 
cretion in granting new trials and in allowin1 
claims under Rule 60(b) (relief from judgment 
or order), but this power is not without limifa· 
tion and cannot be exercised capriciously or arbi· 
trarily. It is elementary that u:nder the circum· 
stances the general rules of procedure are bindini 
and that a party who has allowed the time w 
move for a new trial to expire is thereafter pr~ 
eluded from doing so. This can be avoided onl1 
where it is made to appear that for one or rnor: 
reasons specified in Rule 60 ( b), justice has been 
so thwarted that equity and good conscience de 
mand this extraordinary relief, and the burd.eu 
of showing facts to justify doing so is upon hrn1 
who seeks such relief." 
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Said Rule 60 (b) relative to judgments provides: 
"On, motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
Court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order or proceeding for the following 
easons: * * * 
''The motion shall be made within reasonable time 
and for reasons (1), (2), (3), and (4), not more 
than three months after the judgment, order, or 
proceedings were ordered or taken. * * * 
"The procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules by an independent adion." 
In the same case, Headnote 4 reads : 
"A trial court has broad discretion in granting 
new trials and in allowing claims under the rule 
authorizing courts to grant a party relief from 
judgments within a reasonable time, not to exceed 
three months after the judgment has been ren-
dered, but this power cannot be exercised arbi-
trarily. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 (b)." 
On June 13, 196±, more than three months had ex-
pired after the entry of the judgment of March 12, 1964, 
when the hearing was had which did not include any 
issue on special compensation to Respondent nor a word 
of evidence thereon, but upon which the Court finally 
entered a judgment on November 9, 1964, in favor of Re-
spondent for $2,500.00. 
As before stated, to this day, now nearly three years 
sinee judgment was entered, no motion for a new trial 
or to he rc-'lieved of said judgment has ever been filed. 
As :-;tated in Am. Jnr. 30A, page 605, Section 632: 
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''Whether proceeding under the ~ommon law or 
a statute? the action .of ~ trial court in granting, 
or refusmg an application to open, modify or 
vacate a judgment is, generally speaking, within 
the judicial discretion of such court. • • • The 
discretion, however, is not a loose, arbitrary and 
lmlicensed jurisdiction, untrammelled by the ob. 
servance of the methods prescribed by law. I! · 
does not authorize a capricious exercise of power 
and will, but is limited to an impartial exercise 
of a sound legal discretion, which may not be 
abused. In the exercise of its discretion, the court 
is guided and controlled by fixed legal principles 
to which the action of the court must conform, 1 
particularly where the application to open or se! 
aside the judgment is made after the term of the 
rendition thereof.'' 
The Supreme Court of the State of California in 
Bowman vs. Bownwn, 178 P. 2d 751, stated: 
''Trial courts can modify or amend their judg· 
ments only as prescribed by law." 
The trial court erred in awarding the Respondent the 
sum of $2,500.00. 
POINT THREE 
THE FINDING OF FACT CONTAINED IN PARA· 
GRAPH 6 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT THAT 
EACH PARTY IS ENTITLED TO $535.00 BONUS 
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY A WORD OF PLEADINGS 
NOR BY ONE WORD OF EVIDENCE OR ANY 
OTHER PROOF, AND AS APPLIED IN THE JUDG-
MENT WOULD GIVE RESPONDENT $535.00 TOO 
MUCH AND APPELLANT $535.00 TOO LITTLE. 
As appears from the statement prepared by Lawrence 
S. Pinnock, C.P.A., (R. 122) the Appellant earned a bonu' 
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of $2,365.96 and Respondent earned a bonus of $908.19 
(R. 122). The bonus of $535.00 to each would be addi-
tional. 
If an additional $535.00 is awarded to each of the 
partners, it must come out of the profits for the year 
which were divided equally between the partners, and 
would thus reduce the profits allowed to each of the 
parties, to wit, $15,556.44 (R. 120-122). 
No mention was made in the court's memorandum de-
cision of a bonus of $535.00, or any amount (R. 107-108). 
Respondent is aware that there is no such bonus 
owing to either party. However, as contained in the Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, he adds $535.00 to 
the amount that Respondent is entitled to receive and 
thus diminishes by $535.00 the amount Appellant would 
receive ( R. 156). 
POINT FOUR 
THAT PORTION OF PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE JUDG-
MENT WHICH READS: "* * * AS MODIFIED UN-
DER WHICH IT IS DETERMINED THAT THE 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO THE SUM OF 
$16,433.22 OUT OF THE CASH ON HAND OF $28,-
723.98" IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
As set out in the schedule of capital accounts reflect-
ing transactions from January 1, 1963, to close of business, 
1964, by Mr. Pinnock (R. 122), the distribution of the 
earnings for the period of January 1, 1963, to the close 
of husiness, 1964, is reflected in the following three items: 
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K iepe LeCheminan1 
Commission ------------------------$16,4 79.79 $ 9,190.9i 1 
Bonus ---------------------------------- 2,365.96 908.J~ 
Share of Profits ---------------- 15,556.44 15,556.tl 
Any payments that would be made to the partiei I 
would necessarily come from the share of profits whicn 
would be divided one-half each after the credits were 
taken out to Mr. Kiepe and Mr. iLeCheminant. 
The share of profits before division is $15,556.411 
each, or a total of $31,112.88. 
If the Respondent is awarded $2,500.00 for "preserv 
ing the mortgage loan asset" plus $535.00 as additional 
bonus, a total of $3,035.00, and Mr. Kiepe is awarded 
the $535.00 as additional bonus, there is to be deducteo 
from the total amount of pro.fits, $31,112.88, the thrn 
items : $2,500.00 plus $535.00, plus $535.00, a total oi 
$3,570. 
Total Profits ------------------------------------$31,112.88 
Total Awards ---------------------------------- 3,570.00 
Balance of Profits --------------------------$27,542.88 
This profit wOUild then be divided one-half to earl 
of the partners, giving each $13,771.44-share of profit~ 
In calculating the final figure used in Paragrph ~ 
of the judgment, there would, therefore, be deducted frot 
the figure of $17 ,066.93 used by Respondent the diffiir 
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ence between $15,556.44, Respondent's share of profits 
as sho\vn in Mr. Pinnock's statement, and the aforesaid 
figure of $13,771.44, a difference of $1,785.00. This re-
duces the figure of $17,066.93 to $15,281.93. 
There would then be added to said figure of $15,-
281.93 the $2,500.00 plus the $535.00, a total of $18,316.93. 
From this figure would be deducted $3,668.22 mentioned 
in said paragraph 6, leaving an amorwnt of $14,648.71, 
instead of $16,433.22 mentioned in said Paragraph 6. 
As in this brief discussed, the Respondent is not 
entitled to $2,500.00 for ''preserving the mortgage loan 
asset'' and he is not entitled to $535.00 as a ndditional 
bonus, and Mr. Kiepe is not entitled to $535.00 as an 
additional bonus. 
rl1he parties can adjust the balance due to. eaJCh other 
after the Court has ruled upon the said matters of 
$2,500.00 and $535.00. 
POINT FIVE 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT OF MARCH 
12, 1964. 
One provision of the judgment of March 12, 1964, 
reads: 
"As to I tern G o.f Plaintiff's schedule received in 
evidence as Exhibit P. 10, reflecting items total-
ling $9,865.00, it is ordered and adjudged that this 
amount shall be placed in a special account, 75 
per cent thereof to be paid by the defendant and 
~5 per (•ent thereof to be paid by the plaintiff. 
'l'lmt all overcharges to customers of the partner-
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ship collected by the partnership for anythin, 
shall be paid from the aforesaid special accoun~, 
• * •. Costs of making such refunds shall be paiii 
out of said special account. When all refuncti 
have been made and all costs deducted, the baJ. 
ance remaining in said special account shall~. 
paid one-half thereof to each of the parties." (R 
~~) ; 
Appellant's motion was to amend the above provi 
sion of the judgment of the court of March 12, 1964, b! 
substituting therefor: 
"As to Item 6 of Plaintiff's schedule received in' 
evidence, as Item P. 10, reflecting items totallin.1 
$10,801.61, it is ordered and adjudged that thi1 
amount shall be placed in a special account, ]j 
per cent of $9,819.65. plus $981.96 thereof to hf 
paid by the defendant, and 25 per cent o.f $981.6~ 
to be paid by the Plaintiff." 
Exhibit P. 10 showed items totalling $9,819.65 plm 
a bonus of $918.65 taken by Respondent. It was an obi~ 
ous mistake or clerical error that the amount of $9,819.6;, 
was written into the judgment and not $9,819.65 plus Ut 
bonus of $981.96, totalling $10,801.61, of which amoun11 
respondent should return 75 per cent of $9,819.65 plur 
$981.96 into the special account, since it was the inten: 
of the Court that all moneys received by the parties ir 
this matter should be returned into the aooount. 
Appellant's motion to amend was argued on July t 
1965. Before counsel for Appellant made the argument 
the Court stated : 
"If there is a typographieal milltake, naturall: 
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can be conformed by stipulation of the parties, 
but other than that, I have heard the case and I 
am not going to make any new-receive any new 
evidence or make any different determination." 
(R. 314-315) 
Counsel for Appellant then stated: 
''It wouldn't make a different determination. 
It would not require any evidence. * * * Looking 
at the exhibit, it can be seen from the exhibit that 
that amount is wrong." (R. 315) 
The Court then stated: 
"\
1V ell, l\lr. Backman can see it as well as the 
Court ean, can't he~" (R. 3115) 
Upon the conclusion of Appellant's argument, coun-
sel for the Respondent stated: 
''I can't understand Mr. Iverson. This is the first 
time we will admit, and we have discussed it a 
number of times, and I have followed his con-
tention, and I believe we can work it out, and if 
there is an apparent error, we drew the judg-
ment." (R. 317) 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court stated: 
"Unless Mr. Baclanan consents to this amend-
ment, motion to amend this paragraph and so on, 
then l will deny it." ( R. 318) 
Thereafter, Mr. Baclm1an would neither agree nor 
refuse to agree to the order amending the judgment, 
and to make the matter appealable, Appellant was obliged 
to prqian• and have the Court s1gn the order denying 
tli1: motion. 
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The rule against giving relief from judgments unless 
motions are filed in time does not apply to relief froru i 
clerical errors. As heretofore stated in this brief, the 
law on this matter is stated in the case of Frost vs. D~ .. 
trict Court of Box Elder County, 96 Utah 196, 83 P. 2d 
737. This Court quoted with approval from FreemaJ1 
on Judgments, Vol. 1, Fifth Edition, Section 141, & i 
follows: i 
"As a general rule, unless control over it has been I 
retained in some proper manner or a statute other 
wise provides, no final judgment can be amendea i 
after the term at which it was rendered or afterit 
otherwise becomes a final judgment. The poweroi 
courts to correct clerical errors and mispriso111 
and to make the record speak the trwth by nunt 
pr-o twnc amendments after the term does not en· 
able them to change their judgments in imbstanc1 
and in material respects." 
This is a unique decision. Counsel for Respondent 
admitted Appdlant was right (R. 317). Yet the Court 
denied the petition to amend. The Court at no time iii· 
dicated that Appellant was not right. He took the posi·. 
tion that he would grant the amendment if Respondent'~ 
counsel would consent thereto, but not otherwise (R. 3181 
Oan a motion be denied in advance of hearing it 
unless the other side stipulates to the Court's grantiii1 
the same, and then after the other side admits that coUJI 
sel making the motion is right, may the Cou:rt deny thr 
motion unless opposing counsel will stipulate to th> 
amendment~ 
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POINT SIX 
THE STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE THIRD 
UNNUMBERED PARAGRAPH OF FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE FALSE 
AND ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The last paragraph on the first page and the balance 
thereof on the second page of the Findings of Fact (R. 
153-154) prepared by counsel for the Respondent are 
entirely false and prejudicial and are not supported by 
the evidence. 
The Court did not read the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law before he signed them. 
The following statement taken from said Findings 
is totally false : 
''Both parties having requested that the Court re-
tain jurisdiction of the case to adjudicate the 
rights and obligations of each party during the 
said 13-rnonth period provided plaintiff and de-
fendant Wt~re unable to reach an agreement, which 
the Court consented to and did do.'' 
The judgment of March 12, 1964, on the hearing had 
of February 13, 1964, finally adjudicated the matters of 
compensation to be paid to· Ruth Barlow and R. L. Chris-
tensen, the fee to be paid to Lawrence S. Pinnock, and 
the matter of compensation to the Defendant for services 
renden'd during the thirteen months prior to the said 
hearing, all of which were adjudged against the Respond-
''nt ( R. 60-64). 
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The Court stated at the end of the hearing on Fe~ 
ruary 13, 1964 : 
''Neither partner will receive any special compen. 
sation for services during this interim perio4 
and all of the expenses, by whichever department ' 
incurred or by whom, will be lumped together 
and deducted from the profit and loss account." , 
(R.245) . 
There was no unresolved dispute on the matter of 
1 
compensation to be paid to Mr. Christensen or Mn · 
Barlow or the special compensation for "preserving the 
mortgage loan asset'' after the judgment of March 12, .' 
1964, was entered. 
As stated in said judgment, the same constituted an 
accord and satisfaction of all claims each of the partiei 
had against the other as of that time (R. 64). 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant submits that the law and the evidenci 
require that: 
1. The award of $2,500.00 to Respondent for ''pre· 
serving the mortgage loan asset" of the partnership It 
1 
set aside. 
2. That the bonus of $535.00 to each partner ht 
set aside. 
3. That the portion of the judgment which provid6 
the amounts of credits to which Respondent is entitlt'ii 
which fixes the amount of refunds dur the Appellant, an·i 
l 
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th<' balance credit due Respondent, be set aside, and the 
parties be left to settle their accounts when the other 
portions of the judgment are ruled upon. 
4. Appellant's motion to amend the judgment of 
March 12, 1964, be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOFl!'AT, IVERSON AND TAYLOR 
